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[T]he primary purpose of the International Court . . .  lies 
in its function as one of the instruments for securing peace 
1 
 
cannot allow the past to be forgotten nor a future to be 
2 
                                                                                                                    
* Upendra D. Acharya, Asst. Professor of Law, Gonzaga University Law School.  I would like to 
express my thanks to Professors Ved Nanda and James Nafziger for their valuable input and support.  I 
also would like to express my appreciation to Matthew McGaughey and Attorney Jeannie Young for 
their insightful suggestions.  I also am thankful to my research assistant, Jeff Briggs, for his hard work, 
insight and support.  
1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT 3 (1982). 
2 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 69 (dissenting opinion of Judge 
Bennouna). 
 
2 CHI.-KENT J. INT L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 
  
of Law and Questions of L egitimacy of the 
Court 
 




It is unfortunate for international law, international justice, 
international lawyers and the system of international governance as a whole 
international governing system, acts as a rubber stamp for the dominant 
power of the Security C
from Serbia seems to fall within this unsatisfactory category.3  However, 
the Kosovo opinion also enhances the role of the General Assembly in 
maintaining international peace and security, and answers important 
questions about the interplay of the roles of the ICJ, General Assembly, and 
Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.  
did not violate international law ignores contentious international legal 
issues.  These include the right to self-determination via remedial 
secession, the law of statehood, the territorial integrity of states, and the 
legal effect of recognition by other states.  Because the ICJ ignored these 
issues in its legal analysis by its adoption of a dearth of judicial reasoning, 
the advisory opinion marks a state of confusion and complicates similar 
independence claims by other territories and entities.   
Perhaps the biggest disappointment is that the majority 
opinion answers little about the core issue: whether the Kosovar people are 
entitled to independence under the principle of self-determination.  Instead 
of addressing this obvious issue, the majority took an exceptionally 
                                                                                                                    
* Upendra D. Acharya, Asst. Professor of Law, Gonzaga University Law School.  I would like to 
express my thanks to Professors Ved Nanda and James Nafziger for their valuable input and support.  I 
also would like to express my appreciation to Matthew McGaughey and Attorney Jeannie Young for 
their insightful suggestions.  I also am thankful to my research assistant, Jeff Briggs, for his hard work, 
insight and support.  
3 Richard Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent, 105 AM. J. INT L. L. 
contends that the Court acted in a somewhat political manner by focusing on the geopolitical wishes 
and avoiding the textual intention of Security Council Resolution 1244.).  
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minimalist approach to the question presented and based its opinion on the 
international legal truism that anything not banned by international law is 
generally permitted.4  Finding that declarations of independence generally 
are not banned in any abstract sense,5 the majority found the declaration of 
independence was made in accordance with international law 
notwithstanding any issues that might arise concerning the actual legal 
status of the physical region known as Kosovo.6  But as dissenting and 
separate opinions point out, the Court should have fully answered all issues 
raised when issuing the advisory opinion on Kosovo.  
From the language of the resolution, it seems like Serbia had 
anticipated that the Court would recognize the explicit language of Security 
Council Resolution 1244 that affirms Serbian sovereignty.7  Therefore, 
Serbia took an initiative to seek an advisory opinion at the General 
 Serbia 
expected the Court to find the declaration to be unlawful, which would help 
Serbia by strengthening its role in future negotiations.  Because Serbia 
believed that the Court would find the declaration unlawful, it did not give 
much attention to the language of the resolution.  The language simply 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
8 
Court did not render any particular legal reasoning or analysis in its opinion 
relating to the legal factors concerning the process of the creation of a new 
state.     
Because the ICJ did not consider whether Kosovo had achieved 
statehood, the Court failed to contribute to the development of international 
-determination via remedial 
secession.9  By revitalizing the archaic international legal truism that 
                                                                                                                    
4 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 2 (declaration of Judge Simma) (citing S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7)) (holding that an act is allowed in the absence of a prohibition). 
5Id. ¶ 83 (determining that the issue of whether the declaration of independence violated international 
law could be decided without consideration of the right to self-determination pursuant to remedial 
secession).  See also id. ¶ 2-
leaves the important question of self-determination unanswered); id. ¶ 20 (dissenting opinion of Judge 
only makes sense in the abstract). 
6 Id. ¶ 122.  See also Falk, supra note 3, at 55 (The author points out that the Serbian claim of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity may be justified for the Court to consider, if not for all of Kosovo, 
at least for the northern ten percent of Kosovo where Serbians are overwhelmingly present.). 
7 S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11(f) U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (Jun. 10, 2010). 
8 G.A. Res. 63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
9 In general, remedial secession, or external self-determination, is legal principle under which a territory 
may break free from the bonds of a state where the people of that territory are denied internal self-
determination by the state. See G.A. Res. 2625. 
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actions not disallowed are permitted,10 the ICJ allowed the political dispute 
over Kosovo to proceed with minimal legal guidance on the real issues 
surrounding the declaration.  In sum, the ICJ advisory opinion expansively 
discussed the jurisdiction of the ICJ, but paradoxically, contributes very 
little to the development of international law concerning the human rights 
and territorial sovereignty issues at hand.  Is it because the context of the 
case was politically and institutionally sensitive?  Was the Court concerned 
about its authority over the long run, given the engagement of a few 
powerful nations and governmental bodies including the US and the EU?  
Most of the cases presented to the Court will be politically and 
institutionally sensitive.  Should the Court have refrained from exercising 
its advisory jurisdiction, as suggested by Judge Keith?11     
This paper identifies and analyzes the legal issues that 
advisory op
addressed.  While an
to the issue of whether the advisory opinion could have eliminated or 
ameliorated further controversy by defining the part
advisory opinion on Kosovo contributes to the development of international 
law concerning remedial secession, statehood, territorial integrity, and the 
legal effect of recognition by other states.  In addition, this paper will 
address whether the advisory opinion has embraced a cogent analysis of 
law and its application to the facts, or whether the ICJ has simply endorsed 
 
 
I . Role of the I CJ in International Peace and Security 
 
As an initial matter, the ICJ had to identify or otherwise reaffirm its 
role in maintaining international peace and security.12  The UN Charter has 
awarded the Security Council with the responsibility for maintaining 
                                                                                                                    
10 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141. 
11 Id
discretion to refuse to answer the question which the General Assembly submitted to it on 8 October 
the Security Council and the General Assembly, and concludes that the Security Council has been 
active in making substantial decisions with regard to the security and civil presence in Kosovo through 
He concludes that only the Security Council has interests in the Kosovo issue, not the General 
Assembly, and if the Security Council had requested an advisory opinion, it would have been a legal 
question presented to the Court.  Since the request for an ICJ advisory opinion is presented by the 
General Assembly, which does not have primary interests in the Kosovo context, made the request 
political rather than legal.  Therefore, the Court should have refused to exercise its jurisdictional 
discretion. 
12 Id. ¶ 22. 
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international peace and security.13  The ICJ does not have direct authority 
to prevent actual outbreaks of violence, but the Security Council may do so 
to maintain international peace and security.14  However, the ICJ conducts 
its peace-preserving function by clarifying and developing international 
law via compulsory15 and advisory opinion jurisdiction.16  Under the so-
called optional clause of the Statute of the ICJ, the Court exercises 
compulsory jurisdiction when a sovereign state voluntarily accepts its 
jurisdiction.  Acceptance is optional because a state that does not submit to 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ, or is not a party to a treaty conferring 
jurisdiction to the ICJ, is not obliged to submit its dispute to the ICJ.17  
Because the compulsory jurisdiction is based upon a voluntary act of a 
state, the C
willingness of Member States.  Although limited in scope due to voluntary 
adjudication, ICJ pronouncements or decisions have made significant 
contributions toward international peace and security by shaping the 
landscape of legal thinking.18   
to illuminate a multitude of points of interest for the benefit of the 
international community.19  The logic is simple.  Peaceful coexistence of 
independent states is one of the major prerequisites of international peace 
and security.  It is impossible to peacefully coexist without commonly 
accepted standards of conduct.  These standards contribute to peace by 
fostering the cause for interdependence and international cooperation in the 
development of economic and social conditions conducive to international 
stability, peace, and security.20  There may be uncertainty or contention in 
how to apply such standards to a particular set of facts.  When such 
                                                                                                                    
13 U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.  
14 Id. 
15 The Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 2. 
16 See 
  The ICJ provides an 
opportunity for settling disputes through an advisory opinion where both parties would hesitate to adopt 
a solution by way of negotiations and creates a climate of respect for the rule of law under its 
compulsory jurisdiction. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 1, at 3.  
17 U.N. Charter art. 36(2).  Article 36(2) of the Statute reads: 
consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the 
  See also NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 14-25 (1989). 
18 -Defense and the Charter A Reply to Professor Moore, 80 AM. 
J. INT L. L. 568, 583 (1986) (citing the Nicaragua Case, the author sta
well to weigh its implications for achieving the goal of an ordered international society in which 
 
19 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 33. 
20 See U.N. Charter art. 1 (Purposes and Principles). 
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disputes or cases of confusion arise, the Court has the judicial 
responsibility to interpret the law concerning the question presented to it 
and deliver a decision or opinion.  This decision or opinion should further 
the development of international law in order to strengthen cooperation 
among nations and contribute to international peace and security.  Advisory 
opinions are not capable of reconciling disputes between states as a matter 
of law, but the 
21  Therefore, when 
the Court exercises its advisory jurisdiction, it should not depart from its 
judicial character in clarifying law and developing international law 
22  
In this way, one of the functions of the Court is to further develop 
international law by keeping abreast of the evolving needs of the 
international community.  But the Court must not be oblivious to the 
danger of undue conservatism and stagnation present in the law.  The Court 
has the responsibility to balance the need for stability and certainty of the 
law on the one hand and the need for the progressive development of law 
on the other.23  In this regard, the ICJ faces a challenge when it delivers an 
advisory opinion: whether it should choose a restrained approach 
concerning principles and laws or whether it should choose a 
comprehensive approach based upon the evolution of judicial and state 
practice in the context of contemporary problems.  Applying the latter 
method, the Court should not allow an action merely because it is not 
disallowed.  This approach will halt the development of international law, 
and will create lacunas for contemporary international legal issues of first 
impression.  Furthermore, this course would seemingly preclude 
application of the equitable principle of ex aequo et bono, even though this 
doctrine is expressly available to the Court when rendering advisory or 
contentious opinions.24  ternational 
peace and security depends upon which approach it embraces.  As a former 
                                                                                                                    
21 Falk, supra note 3, at 52. 
22 SINGH, supra note 17, at 35. 
23 See OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 3-38 (1951) (The author discusses the general role of law in 
society; the functions of international law and its application by the ICJ in reducing friction in the 
international community; the need for the development of international law; judicial decisions in the 
-developing function as conditions of peace.). 
24 The Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 ¶ 2 (allowing the ICJ to utilize principles of 
equity when rendering advisory opinions, including ex aequo et bono, meaning 
and good. ).  
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 or 
pacis tutela apud judicem.25 
 
I I . Jurisdictional Questions and Separation of Powers within UN 
Agencies 
 
In the Kosovo opinion, the ICJ first had to determine whether it 
had jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion at the request of the General 
Assembly and, if so, whether it should exercise that jurisdiction.26  There 
are two legal conditions to be met before requesting an advisory opinion.  
First, an authorized body must request an advisory opinion under ratione 
personae jurisdiction.  Second, an advisory opinion must be related to a 
legal question within the purview of the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute to 
satisfy the ratione materiae jurisdiction requirement.27  On the initial issue 
requested by an organ 28  The majority also 
29 
Five judges on the fifteen-judge panel objected30 
assertion of jurisdiction because the Security Council was seized of the 
matter and the question presented was a political, not legal one.31  On the 
any recommendation with regard to [any matter seized by the Security 
                                                                                                                    
25 Id.; SINGH, supra note 17, at 1.  The Latin proverb is carved on the façade of the Peace Palace at The 
Hague.   
26 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 17-48.  
27MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: 
1946-2005 39 (2006).  Other scholars have added elements or conditions to the two conditions 
precedent for the Court to exercise its advisory opinion jurisdiction.  For example, Shavtai Rosenne 
states two elements: 1) competence of the requesting organ and 2) the subject matter (legal nature) of 
the request.  3 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-
1996 1028 (1997). In addition, Chittharanjan Amerasinghe states that the Court, when it conflicts with 
its own judicial character, must protect its judicial character in exercising its jurisdiction.  
CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (2003) at 154.  
28 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 19 (citing Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1982 I.C.J. 66, ¶ 21 (July 23)). 
29 Id. ¶ 21 (citing U.N. Charter art. 96 ¶ 1). 
30 Judges Tomka, Koroma, Keith, Bennouna and Skotnikov made the objections.  Kosovo Opinion, 
2010 I.C.J. 141.  Judge Keith, in particular, dissented on the issue of jurisdiction asserting that the Court 
should not have exercised its discretion to accept the question because the General Assembly should 
never have posed it to the Court.  Id. ¶ 1 (separate opinion by Judge Keith). 
31 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 24, 26.  
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Council] unless the 32  However, an advisory 
the UN Charter merely limits what the General Assembly can do with an 
advisory opinion, not whether it may issue it in the first place.33  
On the issue of whether the question presented was legal or 
rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by their very nature 
ble of determination under 
Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the ICJ Statute.34  The majority 
indicated that a response to a legal question with political underpinnings 
could be dispensed with by addressing the legal aspects of the question 
presented and ignoring the political aspects.35  Judge Cançado Trindade 
even went so far as to say that the distinction between whether a question is 
legal or political is illusory because issues can have both legal and political 
aspects, and legal theory is commonly enmeshed in the political process.36  
Whether a question is legal or political concerns the resolution of a 
question, not its content, and judicial opinions need necessarily deal only 
with legal issues.37  
 all legal issues may 
have political aspects because all laws, one way or the other, are by-
products of political processes.  Once a legal question is brought to the 
Court, even one loaded with political aspects, it is the duty of the Court to 
adopt a legal method to address the question in order to develop legitimate 
guidance for the future political behavior of nations.  Law and politics are 
intertwined; nevertheless, they depart from each other in two fundamental 
ways.  First, they depart in terms of purpose because the purpose of politics 
is power and the purpose of law is justice.38  And second, legal disputes, 
unlike political disputes, are resolved by adopting legal/judicial methods.  
resolution
                                                                                                                    
32 Id. 
dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not 
make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so 
 
33 Id. ¶ 24 (citing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion (Palestinian Wall Case), 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 25 (July 9). 
34 Id. ¶ 25 (citing Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 15 (Oct. 16)). 
35 Id. ¶ 27 (citing Conditions of Admission of a State in Membership of the United Nations (Article 4 of 
the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, at 61 (May 28); Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95, ¶ 13 (July 8)). 
36 Id. ¶¶ 8-12 (separate opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade).  
37Id. 
38 See Upendra D. Acharya, War on Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terrorism, 37 
DENV. J. INT L L. & POL Y 653, 653 (2009). 
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Council resolution, however legally accurate, would be politically 
39  
dissent elaborates on this point by stating that inaction by the Security 
is 
consistent with the role of the Security Council in maintaining international 
peace and security.40  Judge Skotnikov points out that the Court declined to 
consider whether Serbia and Montenegro had become a state prior to 
recognition by the international community and membership in the United 
Nations,41 even though the issue was crucial for jus standi,42 or standing.  
Applying the rationale of the prior case, Judge Skotnikov argued that the 
ICJ should not have answered the political question of whether the 
declaration was legitimate because this was an issue bearing on statehood.43  
Judge Bennouna agreed, writing that the request for the advisory opinion 
was used to exploit the ICJ in a political debate.44  Despite these 
oppositions to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICJ, the majority of the 
Court ultimately found that it had jurisdiction.45 
Finding it had jurisdiction, the majority next turned to the question 
of whether it should deny the request for an advisory opinion on prudential 
grounds.  The Court may refuse to give an advisory opinion if a statute or 
that the ICJ has the 
right to decline jurisdiction.46  Interestingly, the ICJ has never refused to 
give an advisory opinion on prudential grounds.  This is because, as the 
majority points out, issuing advisory opinions is an important aspect of the 
                                                                                                                    
39 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 9 (dissenting opinion of Judge Skotnikov). 
40 Id. at ¶ 54-57 (dissenting opinion of Judge Bennouna). 
41 Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), Preliminary Objection, 2004 I.C.J. 279, ¶ 
79 (Dec. 15). 
42 Jus standi, in relation to jurisdiction, is understood to ower to solve concrete disputes 
and is an autonomous and separate processual condition.  Substantively, it means a general, potential 
right of a State entitling it, under the additional proviso of the existence of a proper jurisdictional 
instrument, to participate in a case before the Court in the capacity of a party as an Applicant, 
Respondent, or intervening party.  As such, jus standi is a general positive processual condition.  It is 
materialized if a State possessing jus standi brings legal action, has an action brought against it, or, in 
accordance with the relevant rules of the Court, intervenes in proceedings pending before the Court.  
Being autonomous, jus standi belongs to a State even if the State is not a party to the dispute or a party 
to the proceedings pending before the Court.  See, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment (Int'l Ct. Justice 
Feb. 26, 2007) ¶ 30 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreca). 
43 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 10-11 (dissenting opinion of Judge Skotnikov). 
44 Id. at ¶ 3 (dissenting opinion of Judge Bennouna). 
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47  Taking the most permissive 
view, Judge Cançado Trindade opined that any discretion in the issuance of 
advisory opinions would serve as an obstruction to the evolution of 
international law, and, therefore, such discretion should never be 
exercised.48  The majority recognized that an important aspect of the 
function is to not deny a request for an advisory opinion from the General 
Assembly. 
Three arguments were made in favor of declining jurisdiction: first, 
states with secessionist objectives requested it.49 Second, the request could 
not provide any useful aid to the General Assembly.50 And third, the 
separation of powers among the ICJ, General Assembly, and Security 
Council does not permit the ICJ to issue advisory opinions on matters 
seized of by the Security Council unless the Security Council makes the 
request.51  The majority quickly dismissed the first argument, pointing out 
that the Court should consider only the organ requesting the opinion, not 
52   
The second argument was given similarly short treatment.  The 
Court wrote: 
Court, to determine whether it needs the opinion for the proper 
53  Two dissenting opinions rejected this line 
of reasoning and noted that the purpose of advisory opinions is to furnish 
54  Since the General Assembly could not perform any action, the 
dissenters noted that the ICJ could not issue an opinion to guide such non-
action.55  This dissenting view clearly ignores the possibility that the ICJ 
can contribute to the discussion and development of public international 
law. 
                                                                                                                    
47 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 30 (citing Palestinian Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. 136; Difference 
Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 78, ¶ 29 (Apr. 29); Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 121 (May 5)). 
48Id. ¶ 27 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade). 
49It is rather curious that this issue would be raised since Serbia, not Kosovo, requested the Advisory 
Opinion.  It is unlikel
independence, wanted to provide an authoritative blueprint for furtherance of secessionist movements, 
as was suggested by participants in the proceedings.  Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 34.  
50Id. 
51Id. ¶ 36.  
52Id. ¶ 33.  
53Id. ¶ 34. 
54Id. ¶ 3 (dissenting opinion of Judge Skotnikov) (quoting Palestinian Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 60).  
See also Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 ¶ 33 (declaration of Vice-President Tomka) (noting that the 
 
55Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 3 (dissenting opinion of Judge Skotnikov).  
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The third argument, 
Security Council, was much thornier.  It raised a strong dissent from Judge 
Skotnikov,56 57  
The relationship among the UN branches is necessarily implicated when 
d 
58  Article 10 of the UN Charter 
allows the General Assembly to discuss matters relating to the powers of 
59  Article 12 prohibits the 
General Assembly from offering recommendations on matters seized by the 
Security Council.  This is crucial because the Security Council seized itself 
of the matter when it issued Resolution 1244, which created an interim 
the Kosovo situation.60  The question became whether the General 
Assembly could request an advisory opinion where the Security Council 
was seized of the situation, where the Security Council had not requested 
the advisory opinion, and where the issuance of the advisory opinion would 
involve interpreting Security Council Resolution 1244.   
The Court determined on several grounds that it could properly 
issue the advisory opinion: the Security Council has a primary, but not 
exclusive role in maintaining international peace and security;61 the 
General Assembly has powers with respect to making recommendations on 
humanitarian issues and discussing international peace and security 
issues;62 and the General Assembly may act in certain situations where the 
Security Council has failed to fulfill its obligations due to a veto by a 
                                                                                                                    
56Id. 
57Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 36-48. 
58Id. ¶¶ 18, 21. 
59 The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the 
present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the 
present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the 
Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions 
or matters.   
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so 
requests. 
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General 
Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace 
and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the 
General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in 
session, immediately the Security Council cea
art 12. 
60Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 118 (citing S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11(f) U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (Jun. 
10, 2010)). 
61 Id. ¶ 40 (citing U.N. Charter art. 24). 
62 Id. ¶ 41. 
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permanent member of the Security Council.63  The plain meaning of the 
UN Charter necessarily implies that concerted efforts by the other organs of 
the UN are needed to serve the broad goal of maintaining international 
peace and security.  T
a situation is related to international peace and security does not mean that 
the General Assembly has no interest in other aspects of the issue, such as 
humanitarian, social, and economic aspects.  The fact that the Security 
Council is seized of an issue does not preclude the General Assembly from 
at issue; it merely 
means that the General As
issue.64  
measures to restore international peace and security where the Security 
Council is unable to reach a decision due to lack of unanimity.65  The Court 
did note that Uniting for Peace came from the Palestinian Wall Case, 
where the Security Council was not seized of the situation.66  However, the 
Court also recognized that it has interpreted the decisions of other organs in 
the past when rendering advisory opinions and deciding contentious 
cases.67   
Those in favor of more restraint by the ICJ will argue that the 
advisory holding falls short of actually applying Uniting for Peace because 
the Court distinguished Kosovo from Israel, noting 
68 and never expressly held that the Security Council 
failed in Kosovo.  However, a broad reading of this holding enables the ICJ 
to issue opinions on matters seized by the Security Council where it is not 
effectively performing its tasks due to vetoes from its members.  After all, 
the Court does adopt the conclusion of Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari that 
Kosovo is independence, to be supervised . . . by the international 
community. 69  Therefore, it may be concluded that the roles of the ICJ, the 
General Assembly and the Security Council are clarified by the decision. 
                                                                                                                    
63 Id. ¶ 42.  
64 Id. ¶ 41. 
65 Id. ¶ 42. 
66 Id. ¶ 42-44. 
67 Id. ¶ 45. 
68 Id. ¶¶ 43-4. 
69 Id. ¶ 69 (citing Letter from Secretary-General to President of the Security Council Attaching Rep. of 
the Spec. Envoy of the Secretary General on Kos. Future Status (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Ahtisaari 
Plan]). 
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First, the request for an advisory opinion is not a recommendation 
by the General Assembly and, therefore, Article 12 does not limit the 
, even if the 
Security Council is exercising its authority under Chapter VII of the 
Charter with respect to a dispute or situation concerning international peace 
and security.70  This conclusion empowers the General Assembly to 
intervene in matters that threaten international peace and security, 
international peace and security.  The Security Council is not the exclusive 
entity to discuss international peace and security.  The General Assembly 
can discuss international peace and security issues, even where those issues 
are seized by the Security Council.71  The Security Council cannot ask the 
General Assembly to refrain from discussing matters of international peace 
and security, as the General Assembly is free to discuss any issue it 
pleases.72  This interpretation clearly inhibits the power of the Security 
Council to create areas of indefinite instability and disrupts the Security 
ion of maintaining 
international peace and security, the Court not only recognized, but also 
rights issues in Kosovo and fifteen resolutions concerning the financing of 
the United Nations .  
The General Assembly did so even though the resolutions were adopted 
after the Security Council actively took up the Kosovo issue in 1998.73 
 the 
meaning of Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of 
the ICJ, the Court will exercise jurisdiction.74  Even if the question has 
some political aspects, the ICJ will not refrain from discharging its 
essentially judicial tasks, as long as the question has legal elements.75  It is 
not necessary for either the General Assembly or any other UN agency 
with authority to request an advisory opinion to explain the purpose of the 
                                                                                                                    
70 Id. ¶ 24.  
71 onsibility as prescribed in Article 24 (1) has not been as 
exclusive in U.N. practice.  The General Assembly adopted the United for Peace resolution by 52 votes 
to 2, (with 2 abstentions) in response to the deadlock that existed in the Security Council.  See United 
for Peace, G.A. Res 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377(V) (Nov. 3, 1950).  See generally DAVID 
SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN 
CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 25-49 (2001).  
72 See to 
discuss any issue).   
73 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 37-38, 40. 
74 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 65.  
75 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 27. 
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question.76  Further, the Court need not inquire into any system of domestic 
law where the international issues operate outside the boundaries of that 
domestic legal system,77 a prerequisite seemingly always present when 
peoples declare independence on the principle of self-determination.  The 
Court could have done a better job explaining how the regime imposed 
under Security Council Resolution 1244 was, in fact, a domestic legal 
provision, given that it resulted in a hybrid legal system: a domestic legal 
provision authorized by an international legal mechanism.78 
Third, the ICJ will reject a request for an advisory opinion by the 
General Assembly or other UN agencies only when the Security Council 
79  Thus, it is clear that the General 
Assembly can ask for an advisory opinion anytime during a process 
initiated by the Security Council in any international peace and security 
reasons
discretion to turn down a request, the Court will issue advisory opinions to 
the UN agencies.80  The Court further affirmed this when it stated: 
purpose of the advisory jurisdiction is to enable organs of the United 
Nations and other authorized bodies to obtain opinions from the Court 
81  
In the end, the Court asserted jurisdiction to deliver the advisory 
opinion requested by the General Assembly, even though the matter is 
under discussion and consideration by the Security Council per Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.  The Court can use and interpret the resolutions passed 
by the Security Council and evaluate the legal effects of the decisions made 
by 
by the General Assembly.82  This approach establishes an expansive 
authority for the ICJ as a judicial organ of the UN that can act under its 
jurisdiction if a question is presented to it.  
In addition, the Court departed from the condition precedent 
condition precedent to a decision of the General Assembly concerning the 
                                                                                                                    
76 Id. ¶ 34. 
77 See generally id. 
could 
not violate that legal order). 
78 Id. 
order.). 
79 Id. ¶ 39. 
80 Id. ¶ 30.  
81 Id. ¶ 44. 
82 E .g., id. ¶ 46. 
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admission of a state as a member of the UN.83  The Court declared that the 
action taken by the General Assembly in requesting an advisory opinion is 
a legal action rather than a recommendation by the General Assembly.  
Thus, the General Assembly undermined the action already taken by the 
Security Council, which had not been exhausted and was still in place.  
Given the drama of veto politics at the Security Council level and the 
serious threat to the democratic aspect of the international legal process, the 
Court suggested an alternative approach that may undermine the ongoing 
role of the Security Council in addressing threats to or breaches of 
international peace and security. 
 
I I I . Declaration of Independence and Relevant International Law 
 
 s 
unwillingness to address the broader legal issues raised by the exercise of 
external self-determination of the Kosovar people.  The majority held that 
the declaration, as an isolated act, did not violate international law.84  But 
actions do not exist devo
did nothing to shed light on the legal issues raised by those surroundings.  
exercise of self-determination violate customary international law?  The 
majority missed the opportunity to answer these important legal questions 
by interpreting the question presented narrowly and specifically85 and by 
describing the action as if it was somehow divorced from its real-world 
consequences.86 
As mentioned earlier, dissents, separate opinions, and declarations 
alike suggest that the Court should have taken a more holistic approach to 
the question presented by elaborating on the issues before it.  For example, 
in his declaration, Judge Simma lamented that the important question of 
self-determination of peoples was abandoned in favor of revitalizing the 
                                                                                                                    
83 Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3) 
 
84 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 122. 
85 See id. ¶ 51. 
86 See Dinah Shelton, Self-Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: F rom Kosovo to Cameroon, 
-determination 
and remedial secession in its Kosovo opinion, which may lead to sources of conflict, practice, and 
jurisprudence in many regions of the world).  See also Marko Divac Oberg, The Legal Effects of United 
Nations Resolutions in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 
C Kosovo opinion turned out to be limited); Falk, supra note 3, at 55. 
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actions not forbidden are permitted.87  Simma pointed out that the question 
of whether declarations of independence were legal had been addressed 
previously by the Supreme Court of Canada when it ruled on self-
determination, and he opined that the Court could have done more to 
advance the understanding and cultivate the development of international 
law.88 
The Kosovo opinion has blurred related aspects of international 
law, including self-determination, remedial secession, statehood, and 
territorial integrity.  In doing so, the Court has ostensibly permitted any 
group subject to human rights abuses to declare independence.  It is 
undisputed that the human rights of Kosovars were abused and autonomy 
was seized by Serbia.  However, their autonomy was restored and human 
rights were advanced during the post-Milosevic era.89  While exercising 
their human rights and autonomy, Kosovars did not practice tolerance 
toward Serbs in Kosovo, but rather were motivated by revenge against their 
prior abusers.90  The Security Council-
could not restrain this vengeance.91  The Security Council can try to resolve 
a problem, but often fails to produce a solution due to political reasons 
because its members have ties to either side of almost every debate.92  As a 
result, any abused group can forego protracted negotiations and merely 
declare independence because, according to the ICJ, this act would not 
violate international law.93  The ultimate legitimacy of this act, it would 
seem, will need to be based upon political factors, such as recognition by 
other states, rather than legal factors.94 
The Court chose to resolve the legal question posed to it based on 
political acts of recognition by other states rather than on judicial 
reasoning.  The Court could have reached the same conclusion without 
disregarding issues of international law.  In deciding the scope of the 
question presented to it, the Court ignored four aspects of international law: 
                                                                                                                    
87 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (declaration of Judge Simma) 
88 Id. 
89 Article VI(2) of the Constitution of FRY incorporated the European Convention for the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms to be applied in Kosovo.  The Kosovo Assembly had the 
power to enact into law other international human rights laws.  Each national community was able to 
elect its own representative and institution.  MARC WELLER, CONTESTED STATEHOOD: KOSOVO S 
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 140-141 (2009). 
90 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILURE TO PROTECT: ANTI-MINORITY VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO, MARCH 
2004 (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/412eec8b4.html. 
91 See generally WILLIAM G. EILL, KOSOVO: AN UNFINISHED PEACE 51-73 (2002).  
92 Recent discussions on Syria at the Security Council is an example of the Security Council  failure to 
reach an agreement due to vetos imposed by China and Russia. 
93 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 2. 
94 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 106 (Can.) (finding the ultimate 
success of unilateral secession would be dependent upon recognition by international community, not a 
decision by a domestic Court). 
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self-determination through remedial secession, statehood, territorial 
integrity and recognition.  Instead, the Court adopted a restraintivist 
approach in answering the question of the declaration.  The Court 
considered the declaration as an isolated act: 
The question put to the Supreme Court of Canada inquired 
whether there was a rule of international law which 
conferred a positive entitlement on any of the organs 
named.  By contrast, the General Assembly has asked 
 The answer to that 
question turns on whether or not the applicable 
international law prohibited the declaration of 
independence.  If the Court concludes that it did, then it 
must answer the question put by saying that the declaration 
of independence was not in accordance with international 
law.  It follows that the task which the Court is called upon 
to perform is to determine whether or not the declaration of 
independence was adopted in violation of international 
law.  The Court is not required by the question it has been 
asked to take a position on whether international law 
conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to 
declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether 
international law generally confers an entitlement on 
entities situated within a State unilaterally to break away 
from it.  Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular act - 
such as a unilateral declaration of independence - not to be 
in violation of international law without necessarily 
constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it.  The 
Court has been asked for an opinion on the first point, not 
the second.95 
 
The Court did not even take the responsibility of addressing 
international legal questions as the Canadian Supreme Court did when 
questioning the legality of secession by Quebec.96  Although, the Court 
mentioned the Canadian case, it unfortunately ignored the international 
legal questions raised by that opinion.97  Is this due to a fear that a majority 
vote could not be reached on the issue of self-determination?  This raises an 
                                                                                                                    
95Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 56. 
96 See generally Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
97 See Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 56. 
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important question regarding the ethical position of the judges.  Had the 
Court, at least the majority, already made up its mind as to the decision it 
was going to make?   
 
A. Right to Self-determination through Remedial Secession 
 
-determination and remedial secession are 
interrelated legal issues.  A group within a territory can exercise a right to 
remedial secession if the group is recognized as a people and the group is 
deprived of its civil, political, social, cultural, religious, and linguistic 
rights.98  Before exercising the right of remedial secession, it is important to 
determine whether a people have attempted to exercise rights as a group 
and have been denied meaningful access.99  If there is a possibility for 
meaningful access, the group may not have the right of remedial secession 
but will have to exercise rights through the domestic government, a process 
known - 100  However, if the existing state is 
not 
then the group may exercise its right of remedial secession as a last resort 
 a process known as external self-determination.101  The ICJ and its 
predecessor recognized the right to self-determination, which has become 
customary in international law and which countries have exercised.102  The 
principle of self-determination is embodied in the UN Charter and General 
Assembly resolutions.103  The right to self-determination allows a people to 
be free from colonial power, but not within countries where the rights of 
peoples are protected.104  It balances the interest of territorial integrity, the 
                                                                                                                    
98 See id. ¶ 138. 
99 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
100 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 174 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade). 
101 Id. See generally, A Report Presented To the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission 
of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7 21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter Åaland Islands Case]. 
102 See generally Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); Åaland Islands Case, 
supra note 101; East Timor (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 I.C.J. 90 (Jun. 30); Western Sahara, Advisory 
Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 61 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 
I.C.J. 16 (Jun. 21).  
103 See U.N. Charter art. 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peac
kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and 
freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be 
 
104 
shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action [by any group] which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of 
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interest in preserving the right of self-determination of peoples, and the 
interest in respecting human rights of minorities.105  The right of self-
determination can manifest in various forms, including autonomy, self-
government, or free association; and it does not automatically trigger the 
right to remedial secession.106  This is because secession generally is at 
odds with the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty as outlined 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter107 and the core principles of international 
law.108  
To distinguish Kosovo and prevent the Balkanization of other 
regions, such as Georgia, states in support of an independent Kosovo 
describe it as sui generis.  This is based on three factors: the status of 
Kosovo as a federal unit prior to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia; 
human rights violations committed by the Serbian forces during the 1999 
conflict; and the international administration of the territory of Kosovo by 
UNMIK.109  On the first point, Kosovo had obtained federal status along 
with the six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) according to its 1974 Constitution.110  
Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
( SFRY ), Kosovo was arguably entitled to independence, just as those 
other republics were entitled to independence.  However, the Milosevic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the people without 
 
105 See, e.g. id.; Falk, supra note 3, at 57 (emphasizing that the exercise of self-determination should 
never be allowed to undermine the unity of an existing sovereign state, and adding that this viewpoint is 
in line with the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc 
A/Res/2625  (Oct. 24, 1970)). 
106 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 176 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. 
Cançado Trindade). 
107 See 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
 
108 See generally, George A. Critchlow, Stopping Genocide Through International Agreement When the 
Security Council Fails to Act  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 
might be read to only be applicable to states because it refers to United Nations Members, this principle 
foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action [by any group] which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the 
(Oct. 24, 1970).  However, the majority opinion finds that U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 only applies to state 
actors.  See Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 80-84. 
109 WELLER, supra note 89, at 270-71. 
110 See id. at 11. 
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independence and autonomy.111  Further, Serbia enacted discriminatory 
legislation directed at the Albanian population in Kosovo: Serbia 
introduced a Serb settlement program to reduce ethnic Albanian population 
numbers, claiming that Kosovo has ancient religious sites important to 
Serbs.112  The second point concerning human rights atrocities follows the 
previous discussion concerning remedial secession based upon repression 
and lack of political representation, as discussed in the Quebec case.113  
This later view is the most widely accepted and even garnered the support 
of Russia.  Although Russia does not believe that Kosovo is entitled to 
independence, it does believe that this principle justifies the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.114  It is not immediately apparent why the 
last point, that Kosovo was internationally administered, would provide an 
impetus for the creation of an independent state.  But international 
administration has been used to facilitate changes in territory before, such 
as in East Timor115 and West Irian.116  
self-governance during this period and the fact that Security Council 
independence of the Kosovars in a manner that sets it apart from other 
regions.117 
Given the number of legal issues swirling around the debate on the 
status of Kosovo, the Court could have taken a different approach, which 
would have contributed to the development of international law by 
applying these principles to a case of first impression.  In Kosovo, the 
118 but had failed to produce a solution.  KFOR provided the 
necessary military presence to avoid violence, but it failed to encourage 
tolerance among t
.119  Negotiations took place under the 
                                                                                                                    
111 WELLER, supra note 89 at 311. 
112 See id.  
113 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) 
114 See, eg, id. at 274.  
115 See G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th sess., Supp. No. 34, at 118 U.N. Doc. A/10634 (1975) (The 
itants of the territory of 
 a right to self-determination.). 
116 -01 (1976) (quoting Report 
of Agenda Item No. 98, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/7723 (1969)). 
117 See id. at 275-76.  
118 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 118.  
119 EILL, supra note 91. 
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Ahtisaari Plan but failed.120  The Troika  the European Union, United 
States and Russia  took responsibility for the negotiations between 
Serbia and Kosovar Albanians.  They also failed.121  On the one hand, both 
the Kosovars and Serbians ignored and disregarded the Security Council 
and the Special Envoy of the UN, who was endorsed by the Security 
Council.  On the other hand, the Troika undermined the Security Council 
process and continued to claim to maintain international peace and 
security.122 This also failed.123  Therefore, the Court implied that where the 
UN system and the international community fail, and where people have no 
room left to negotiate, people can declare independence under the principle 
of remedial secession; the right to self-determination need not be 
discussed.124  The Court rushed to deliver its legal opinion without 
examining the factual and legal backgrounds concerning the right to self-
determination and secession.125  If the Court would have discussed these 
legal principles and concluded that the declaration accorded with 
international law, it would have challenged the structural and functional 
existence of the United Nations system and the role of self-proclaimed 
peacekeeping nations on the Security Council. 
Dissenting Judges Koroma, Bennouna, Skotnikov, and Vice 
President Tomka focused on the lex specialis, and would have liked to 
dispose of the question presented by simply stating that the legal 
framework of UNMIK does not provide for the self-determination of the 
Kosovar people.126  This approach begs the question of whether Security 
                                                                                                                    
120 Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on 
(The U.N. Security Council did not 
l to grant independence to Kosovo). 
121 Press Release, U.S.-E.U.-Russ. Troika, Troika Press Release Communique: The Baden Conference 
(Nov. 28, 2007)  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/PressData/en/declarations/97300.pdf.  
122 No coalition of powerful nations can act as the Security Council or on behalf of the Security Council 
without prior authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
123 Press Release, U.S.-E.U.-Russ. Troika, Troika Press Release Communique: The Baden Conference, 
supra note 121. 
124 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141. 
125 E .g., GA Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc A/Res/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); Vienna Program of Action, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (Jul. 12, 1993); U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protections of Minorities on its 45th Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/45 (1993); Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 20, The Guarantee of Human 
Rights Free from Racial Discrimination (Forty-eighth session, 1996), U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII at 
124 (Sept. 30, 1996), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.6 at 208 (2003).  
126 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma); 
id. (dissenting opinions of Judge Bennouna, Judge Skotnikov, Vice President Tomka). 
 
22 CHI.-KENT J. INT L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 
  
Council Resolution 1244 must provide for the right of self-determination, 
because it is a jus cogens principle guaranteed to all peoples.127  Although 
these opinions appear to state the obvious  that self-determination of 
peoples can be shaped by Security Council intervention to maintain 
international peace and security  they appear to go one step too far in 
granting deference to the Security Council with respect to action or inaction 
regarding the self-determination of peoples.  It may be true that the 
Security Council has a duty to maintain international peace and security, 
and that an issue of self-determination can trigger this duty.  But it does not 
follow that the Security Council may abrogate the right to self-
determination for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a nation. 
Council could issue resolutions that violate human rights and humanitarian 
law, or reject any human rights and humanitarian law where realization of 
 This would 
be true even if the Security Council were completely deadlocked and could 
not address the issue itself due to inaction of the permanent members of the 
Sec
condition, as the implications of their reasoning would do far more harm to 
the maintenance of international peace and security than just hamstringing 
ks in the Security Council in 
accordance with Uniting for Peace. 
The approach espoused by Judge Cançado Trindade most 
advisory opinions.  Judge Trindade found that self-determination is an 
international legal issue linked to human rights, and is a topic particularly 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.128  He went on to elaborate on the issue 
of self-determination in great detail.  Before doing so, he pointed out that 
  at least 
directly  disputes between States, but to offer legal advice to the organs 
129  Further, the purpose of giving 
an advisory opinion is to contribute prevalence of the rule of law in 
130 
                                                                                                                    
127 Report of the International Law Commission on the second part of its seventeenth session and 
eighteenth session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1(1966) at 248. 
128 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 16 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. 
Cançado Trindade) (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL, 174 (Cambridge University Press 1995)). 
129 Id. ¶ 17 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade). 
130 Id. ¶ 25 (emphasis in original). 
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To support his assertion that the Court should have addressed the 
Trindade indicated that the Court has done so in the past.131  In the 1971 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the Court, in great detail, 
er[ed] and summarize[ed] some of the issues underlying the 
132  In particular, Judge Trindade emphasized that 
the Court in Namibia decided to address the human rights issues underlying 
the question presented.133 
Judge Trindade also pointed to the Advisory Opinion of 1975 
concerning Western Sahara, which addressed the social and political 
context of the Western Saharan population.134  In addition, the 2004 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory illustrates yet another instance where 
establishment of settlements in the occupied territories.135  The ICJ found 
that the Israeli action violated the right to self-determination of the 
Palestinian people.136  Had the ICJ merely determined that it was legal for 
Israel to construct walls in the abstract sense, the decision would not have 
been a legitimate decision and would not have been helpful. 
The ICJ offered more examples.  In the case concerning Armed 
Activities in the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ carefully considered the 
factual background before deciding that violations of international 
humanitarian law had been committed.137  Ironically, the human rights 
atrocities suffered by the Kosovar people were documented by a case not 
mentioned in the majority opinion.138 
According to Judge Trindade, the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Kosovo and its subsequent declaration of independence set the stage for 
Security Council Resolution 1244.  But neither Security Council 
Resolution 1244 nor the declaration of independence can be viewed 
                                                                                                                    
131 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 36. 
132 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 44 (Jun. 21). 
133 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 36 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade). 
134 Id. (citing Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 89). 
135 Id. (citing Palestinian Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 79-85). 
136 Palestinian Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J. 136.    
137 Id. ¶ 39 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade) (citing Armed Activities in the 
Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 211 
(Feb. 3, 2006)). 
138 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 36 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade) (citing 
Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force, (Yugoslav. v. Belg.), Request for the Indication of Interim 
Measures, 1999 I.C.J. p. 131 ¶ 16)). 
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without considering the human rights abuses that led to those actions.  
 
Judge Trindade ultimately concludes that the Kosovar Albanians are 
entitled to self-determination because they constitute a people and were the 
subject of historical oppression, subjugation, and tyranny.139  But, the ICJ 
did not consider the broader factual background showing violations by both 
sides to the conflict.140  
Notably, Judge Trindade takes a differing view on the separation of 
powers issue.  
only seized of situations to provide for 
international peace and security by making declarations that are neither 
permitted nor prohibited under international law.141  He accurately suggests 
that the interest in protecting fundamental jus cogens human rights from 
severe violations is more important than the jurisdictional issue that 




Statehood is a major legal consideration for an entity or group that 
breaks off from its mother state and claims to become an independent state.  
International law regarding statehood demands that four criteria be satisfied 
to establish statehood under the Montevideo Convention.142  Those four 
criteria are: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and 
                                                                                                                    
139 Id. ¶ 175 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade). 
140 Relevant background facts may include 
Albanians, reverse ethnic cleansing in aid of the project of an independent Kosovo, the effect of 
bombing in Kosovo, -legal investigations of the Racak incident, and all other aspects 
of the humanitarian violations committed by both sides within the SFRY. For factual analysis see JOHN 
NORRIS, COLLISION COURSE: NATO, RUSSIA, AND KOSOVO (2005) (The author presents Kosovo as a 
misadventure by NATO, in which NATO did not consider the centuries-old border dispute between 
Serbia and Albania in its political agenda and caused excessive damages in the Kosovo bombing as a 
result of not having ground troops.); MICHAEL MANDEL, HOW AMERICA GETS AWAY WITH MURDER: 
ILLEGAL WARS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, 57-114 (2004) (The author 
has highlighted the facts with contexts and argued that the U.S. and other NATO countries have 
destroyed the true meaning of international rule of law by manipulating the facts or ignoring the real 
humanitarian issues in Kosovo and they have escaped liability for an illegal war in Kosovo.); WELLER, 
supra note 89 (The author has presented a comprehensive factual and legal background of the Kosovo 
.)    
141 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 175- 220 (separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade).  
See also Oberg, supra note 86, at 81 (analyzing the legal effects of the Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions and delegation of authority from Security Council Resolution 1244 in the Kosovo 
Opinion, and concluding that the Court declined to be bound by a factual determination addressed in the 
General Assembly Resolution and validated the extensive power of the Security Council in delegating 
its power concerning international territorial administration.).  
142 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
 
N o .  1  K o s o vo  D e c i s i o n   25 
 
the capacity to enter into international relations.143  As prescribed by the 
Montevideo Convention, statehood as a legal theory is akin to a minor 
entering adulthood.  It requires that all four attributes of statehood be 
satisfied in an objective manner so the new state can be a responsible 
member of the international community.  With all four criteria satisfied, 
statehood provides political existence to a state; however, political 
recognition by other states does not establish the legality of statehood.144 
While pronouncing the Kosovo declaration to be in accordance 
with international law, the ICJ does not address the legal factors that 
determine statehood.  How can a state be independent if the state has not 
satisfied the legal criteria of statehood?  If Kosovo has satisfied the four 
necessary criteria of statehood, why would the ICJ be reluctant to address 
this aspect of the proble  avoidance of this issue eliminate 
the need to consider the important legal fundamentals concerning 
independence?  The answer is simple  no.  Again, the ICJ missed the 
opportunity to contribute to the development of international law regarding 
the independence of a state.  Statehood is a major legal principle that is 
dence, as well as to the 
issue of international peace and security.  By not addressing the issue of 
statehood, the ICJ has not only done an injustice to the legal aspect of 
statehood, but has also endorsed the practice of prematurely declaring 
independence and the practice by  of immediately 
recognizing newly independent states without regard to the rules of 
international law concerning the right to self-determination, statehood, and 
territorial integrity.  This political practice of undermining the rules of 
international law has created friction among nations, causing sour relations 
and international insecurity.  At least the ICJ could have produced some 
standards interpreting the law of statehood in relation to independence for 
Kosovo and for future potential territories.145  By not establishing any 
standards on statehood, the ICJ has explored the third degree of self-
                                                                                                                    
143 Id. at Art. 1. 
144 Id tion by the other states. 
Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for 
its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its 
interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its Courts. The 
exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to 
 
145 South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Kosovo are already a few examples of political practice in creating 
independent nations, which the ICJ has endorsed by its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. See Kosovo 
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141. 
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146 
Serbia and Albania both may claim territorial rights over Kosovo.  
For Serbia, Kosovo has always been Serbian land.  For Albania, people in 
Kosovo are Kosovar Albanians who moved to Kosovo hundreds of years 
ago.  However, the requirement of territory is at times not necessary for a 
state to be legally justified.147  
population is a permanent population due to Serbian and Albanian refugees 
that have moved in and out of Kosovo during the conflict period.  Kosovo 
now has a government, but the stability of the Kosovar government 
depends upon the EU and the UN.148  Because international forces provide 
149 Kosovo by itself does not have 
the capacity to enter into relationships with other sovereign nations  at 
least until the international guarding agencies and forces produce a 
peaceful transition toward nation building.150  Thus, it has been claimed 
that Kosovo never satisfied the criteria of statehood within the meaning of 
public international law, as it lacked the necessary effective governmental 
control over the territory, an essential constituent element of statehood.151  
The question here is not whether Kosovo should be granted independence, 
but rather whether the ICJ approached the legal dispute regard
independence with sound legal analysis.  By not bringing these legal 
Box for political elements to influence similar decisions in the future. 
The ICJ could have elaborated on its reasoning by analyzing these 
facts and applying the relevant laws to them.  If the ICJ had considered the 
issue of statehood, it could have turned to other legal theories that may 
earned 
                                                                                                                    
146 Falk, supra note 3, at 58 (describing and analyzing the first, second, and third degree of self-
future, it will be an example of self-determination to the third degree, though not officially described as 
such. The first degree is a t the level of a sovereign state, as when a society manages to achieve political 
independence and end colonial rule. The second degree is a domestically sovereign unit of the sort that 
constitutes federal states, such as the sovereign states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. The third degree is an ethnic/geographic fragment of a federal substate unit, 
such as the claimant movement in Chec  
147 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER, & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, 
ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 115 (3d ed. 2010).  
148 S.C. Res. 1244; Interim agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999 
[hereinafter Rambouillet Accord]. 
149 The UNMIK and KFOR. 
150 John Cerone, 
Recognition  
151 Andreas Zimmermann & Carsten Stahn, Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or 
Sovereign State? Reflection on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo, 70 NORD. J. INT L L. 
423, 427 (2001). 
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sovereignty.152  Under this theory, it is expected that the new state 1) will 
be able to maintain independence in its state actions by following a UN 
sanctioned pattern and 2) will become a reliable partner in the world 
community.  This theory is desc 153  
Another theory of independence that may be applicable is the theory of 
qualified state sovereignty.154  
ethnic cleansing under the regime of Milosevic.  This oppression, however, 
led to humanitarian intervention in Serbia to protect Kosovar Albanians in 
Kosovo, which in turn led the international community and the UN to 
consider the final status of Kosovo.  Albanians were not protected by the 
laws of Serbia, so with international assistance and guardianship, Kosovo 
may exercise local authority toward becoming an independent sovereign 
nation.155 
The ICJ could have also focused on humanitarian intervention and 
the international effort to separate a country.  All the steps undertaken by 
the Security Council, NATO and the UN until the declaration of 
independence create a connection between the NATO bombing in Kosovo 
and the rush to recognize the independence of Kosovo by some nations.  
However, all the relevant GA resolutions, the Athisaari Plan, and the 
Troika negotiations acknowledge the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Serbia.156  The members of the Security Council and Troika who were also 
involved in the UNMIK process disregarded the acknowledgement.  The 
ICJ did not even bother to analyze this legal aspect of the conflict.157  
 
C . Territorial Integrity 
 
The principle of territorial integrity restricts the principle of 
external self-determination, otherwise known as remedial secession, 
                                                                                                                    
152 James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimension, 31 DENV. J. 
INT L L. & POL Y 355, 356 (2003) (defining earned sovereignty as a process for attaining legitimate 
state sovereignty and which is comprised of three core elements: 1) shared sovereignty, 2) institution 
building, and 3) status determination and three optional elements: 1) phased sovereignty, 2) conditional 
sovereignty, 3) constrained sovereignty). 
153 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., F inal Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 6 (2005). 
154 Hooper & Williams, supra note 152. 
155 Id. 
156 Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, supra note 120. 
157 The U.N. involvement in finding a political solution appeared to be the factor for the secession of 
 the former Yugoslavia did not 
involve U.N. involvement in finding a political solution. Does this mean that when the U.N. gets 
involved in finding a political solution in a disturbed territory there will be a likelihood of secession? 
Does the U.N. or the Security Council have the power to separate an independent country under the 
broad authority of international peace and security? See generally Bing Bing Jia, 8 CHINESE J. INT L L. 
1, 27-46 (2009).  
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whereby a portion of a state  from the parent 
state in order to form a new state.  Territorial integrity is and has been one 
of the central principles of international law because it directly relates to 
peaceful coexistence among nations.  Quoting the Helsinki Conference and 
Friendly Declaration, Judge Trindade points out that the principle of 
territorial integrity is not a shield when the people of a state are subjected 
to human rights abuse by that state.158    
Sticking to its economy of legal analysis, the Court did not go quite 
as far.  Referring to Nicaragua v. United States,159 the majority proclaimed 
that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity of any state.160  The Kosovo 
majority opinion skirted the issue by holding that the principle of territorial 
integrity is confined to the sphere of the relations between states,161 and 
thus the declaration of independence by a people within a state is primarily 
a domestic affair.  However true this may be, the majority missed an 
opportunity to clarify the law of remedial secession.  This omission 
probably occurred because the majority agreed upon the decision to be 
made but could not agree upon the reasoning underlying that decision. 
The majority seemed to suggest that the declaration could not 
violate international law unless it was accompanied by a separate violation 
of international law by the Kosovar people, such as the achievement of 
independence through violent insurrection and human rights abuses.162  
Indeed, this view is in keeping with the relatively little that international 
law has to say about the law of secession.163  It is widely accepted that 
states cannot legally recognize as legitimate the results of an internationally 
wrongful act.164 
overly restrictive and narrow reading of the question presented to it.165  The 
ICJ basically implied that UNMIK, under Security Council Resolution 
s declaration of independence 
is not illegal.  Therefore, Kosovo does not have to demonstrate the legality 
                                                                                                                    
158 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 177-181. 
159 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 101, ¶ 191 (Jun. 27). 
160 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 80. 
161 Id.; Cerone supra note 150, at 60. 
162 Elena Cirkovic, , 
11 GERMAN  L.J. 895,  902 (2010). 
163 Cerone, supra note 150, at 64. 
164 Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex art. 40, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/83/Annex (Dec. 12, 2001). 
165 Kosovo Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶ 2 (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf). 
 
N o .  1  K o s o vo  D e c i s i o n   29 
 
ruling that the declaration of independence did not violate Security Council 
Resolution 166  
The ICJ justified its disregard of the territorial issue by stating that the 
declaration is one thing, while the successful establishment of an 
independent state is another.  The ICJ dismissed the declaration as a mere 
piece of paper, although over sixty countries had recognized Kosovo as an 
 
 
D . Recognition and Its Legal E ffect 
 
There are two theories of international law regarding recognition: 
the constitutive theory and the declarative theory.  The constitutive theory 
holds that recognition of a state is not automatic.  A state may become a 
state only when other states recognize it as such.  Since there is no 
particular international law of recognition, other states exercise their 
discretion in recognizing a new state, and this becomes a political act of 
other states rather than a legal one.167  This theory tends to undermine the 
elements of statehood under the Montevideo Convention and suggests that 
declarative theory of recognition permits a new state to assert its existence 
by its own declaration of recognition as a state once the new state can 
establish that it has satisfied the four criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention.  This theory presupposes that statehood is a legal 
of that legal determination.168 
While the constitutive theory regards recognition as a condition 
precedent to statehood, the declarative theory merely requires that a state 
asserts its sovereignty to become sovereign.169  Both theories, however, are 
instrumental in analyzing recognition and its effects and compliance with 
the Montevideo criteria, but they do not provide any particular solution to 
the problem of statehood.  Rather, they merely highlight the existing divide 
between scholars and state practices.170  Although most legal scholars agree 
                                                                                                                    
166 Michael Bothe, Kosovo-So What? The Holding of the International Court of Justice is not the Last 
, 11 GERMAN  L. J. 837, 839 (2010). 
167 Hersch Lauterpacht argues that a new state exists only when other states recognize the new state. 
Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385, 419 (1944).     
168 William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Concept of the State in State Recognition Theory, 
  115, 116 (2009). 
169Jure Vidmar, , 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT L L. 779, 827 (2009).  
170 Worster, supra note 168 (describing and analyzing the existing divide between scholars and state 
practices concerning the recognition theories and modes of state recognition). 
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that recognition is just a political action and not a legal one, the ICJ in the 
Quebec case held that recognition legitimizes the creation of states.171  
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how a state could exist without 
recognition, given that the Montevideo Convention requires that all states 
have the capacity to enter into foreign relations.  The Badinter 
Commission, in its opinion on the status of statehood in the former 
172  International law of recognition took a different turn when 
have attempted to include normal standards of international practice,173 
political realities, commitment to the UN Charter, the rule of law, 
principles of democracy and human rights norms.174  However, the case of 
the Former Yugoslavia is one of dissolution, not of secession, as found by 
the Badinter Commission.175 
Kosovo is more likely a case of secession, and the question of 
statehood and recognition could be much more contestable than other 
provinces of the Former Yugoslavia.  Sixty-nine states have recognized 
Kosovo as an independent state, thus meeting the fourth element of the 
Montevideo criteria  the capacity to enter into foreign relations based on 
the declaration of independence.  What is the legal situation regarding the 
recognition of states under international law?  This question has neither 
been asked nor answered.176  However, one could extrapolate the following 
does not prohibit recognition, although the ICJ did not confirm whether 
Kosovo had reached statehood.  The ICJ did not bother to consider whether 
premature recognition constitutes a prohibited intervention into the internal 
affairs of another state or whether the Security Council had terminated its 
recognition of the territorial claim of Serbia under S.C. Res. 1244.  The ICJ 
seems to conclude that the territorial integrity claim of Serbia is still open, 
that Security Council Resolution 1244 regime is still valid, and thus 
negotiations must continue.177  While Security Council Resolution 1244 is 
                                                                                                                    
171Vidmar, supra note 169, at 828. 
172 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion Nos. 1 and 8 31 I.L.M. 1488 and 1494 
(1992) [hereinafter Badinter Commission].  Although the Badinter Commission emphasized that the 
recognition by other states has no legal effect the European Community foreign ministers and the US 
decided to recognize Bosnia.  DUNOFF, RATNER, WIPPMAN, supra note 147, at 143. 
173 Which could be Montevideo criteria. 
174 Declaration on the Guidelines of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 31 I.L.M. 
1486 (1992).   
175 Badinter Commission,Opinion No. 1 1494 , supra note 172.  
176 Bothe, supra note 166, at 838. 
177 Id. 
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valid, the ICJ said that the authors of the declaration of independence did 
not violate the resolution because as actors outside of the UN Framework, 
they are not obligated to comply with it.  Are Kosovars not part of the 
negotiations under the framework designed to address the Kosovo issue?  
The ICJ avoids this question by treating as separate entities the Kosovo 
government in place at the time of Security Council Resolution 1244 and 
the Kosovo people.  This is so even though the persons that signed the 
declaration were members of the Kosovar government.178 
The ICJ did not consider past and possible future accusations or 
investigations by relevant tribunals, such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia ( ICTY ) of crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
or genocide committed by the authors of the declaration.  There are already 
some questions as to the criminal liability and lawfulness of the 
representation of Kosovo leadership in respect to abusing the human rights 
of minorities, such as the Serbs in Kosovo during the conflict.179  The ICJ 
should have scrutinized the legal effect of recognition and authorship of the 
declaration of independence in order to answer unsettled questions.  But it 




By narrowing the scope of the question presented to it and not 
addressing the relevant international law issues, the ICJ has placed itself at 
odds with the judicial history of the ICJ.  This ICJ may be remembered, not 
for what it said, but for what it did not say.  It is apparent that the ICJ was 
not interested in contributing to the development of international law 
concerning the declaration of independence because it ignored the major 
international legal issues pertaining to the question, which may be regarded 
as a judicial endorsement of political might rather than a cogent analysis of 
international law.  It is unfortunate that the ICJ was not able to bring much 
                                                                                                                    
178 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (Kosovo Opinion), 2010 I.C.J. 141, ¶¶ 16-20 (declaration of Vice-President 
Tomka). 
179 Former Prime Minister of Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj was accused of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes committed against Roma minorities when he led the KLA in 1998.  After the indictment, he 
stepped down as President of the Provisional Self-government of Kosovo.  Later, he was acquitted in 
2008 due to lack of evidence.  The case was ultimately reopened by the Appeals Camber.  He was 
indicted again and his arrest was ordered just three days before the publication of the Advisory Opinion.  
Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Case no. IT-04-84-T Appeals Chamber Judgment (July 19, 2010) 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf. Even Hashim Thaci, President of 
Kosovo has been charged with a number of crimes for acts committed during the Kosovo conflict with 
Serbia in the late nineties. See Bjorn Arp, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo and the 
International Protection of Minorities, 11 GERMAN L. J. 847, 856 (2010). 
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clarity and legal certainty to important relevant legal aspects of the Kosovo 
conflict with regard to independence, statehood, territorial integrity, 
secession, self-determination, and the legal effect of recognition.  Rather, it 
left these issues to be answered by state practices based on political 
stratagems.180  Other factors worth mentioning that might have guided the 
ICJ to reach its conclusion include: the poor drafting of General Assembly 
R
expectation that the ICJ would find the declaration unlawful; the failed 
tacit fear that by not bringing its opinion in line with a few permanent 
members of the Security Council, the ICJ would lose its legitimacy.  
Whatever other factors there might be, the ICJ had the opportunity to 
clarify certain legal standards with regard to the process of the creation of a 
new state, particularly during a time when ethnic, political, and 
geographically based movements and demands for new states are on the 
rise. 
                                                                                                                    
180 Professor Richard Falk, an international law expert presents a similar view. Referring to the Kosovo 
Opinion, Professor Falk s
supra note 3, at 51. 
